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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction under U.C.A.§78-2-2(3)(j); the 
Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. § 
78-2-2(4). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The trial court's summary judgment ruling presents the following issues on appeal: 
a. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the plaintiffs real estate agent acted 
within her actual/implied or apparent authority when she instructed the 
defendant Equity Title Insurance Agency, Inc., to close plaintiffs land sale. 
b. Whether the trial court correctly ruled defendant Equity Title Insurance 
Agency, Inc met its fiduciary duties to plaintiff when its escrow agent, absent 
written authorization, closed plaintiffs sale without the surety bond required 
under the terms of the real estate purchase contract. 
The standard of review for both issues is correctness: An appellate court reviews a 
grant of summary judgment without deference to the trial court's legal conclusions, and 
considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party. The reviewing 
court affirms only where there is no genuine dispute as to material issues of fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wycalis v. Guardian Title of 
Utah, 780 P. 2d 821, 824 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
These issues were reserved for appeal because the appellant filed a timely 
notice of appeal (R. 628-630) following the trial court's entry of a minute order on May 
24, 2005 granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant/Appellee Equity Title 
Insurance Agency, Inc. and defendant Independence Title Insurance Agency. 
Addendum 1. 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following state statute and administrative rule are of central importance in 
this appeal: 
U.C.A. § 25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of 
any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is 
to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
U.A.C.A. R162-6-1. Licensee Conduct. 
6.1.11.1. A principal broker and licencees acting on his behalf who represent a 
seller shall have a written agency agreement with the seller defining the scope of the 
agency. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The complaint in this case was filed on January 31, 2004, in Third District Court 
in Salt Lake City, against Equity Title Insurance Agency, Inc. (Equity) and Independence 
Title Insurance Agency (Independence). R. 1-23. (Complaint). The complaint alleged 
breach of fiduciary duty, negligence and breach of contract against the defendants for 
closing Posner's land sale without the surety bond required by his Real Estate Purchase 
Contract, thereby effecting a sale to an unqualified buyer. R. 7-10. 
On February 9, 2004, Independence filed a Motion and Memorandum to dismiss. 
R. 24-26, R. 27-32. On February 25, plaintiff filed its Memorandum in Opposition to 
Independence's Motion to Dismiss (R. 39-44), and Independence filed its Reply on 
February 27. R. 48-55. The trial court denied Independence's motion to dismiss on May 
10, 2004. R. 75. 
On March 3, 2004, Equity filed its Answer to plaintiffs complaint. R.56-66. On 
December 22, 2004, the plaintiff moved to amend its first complaint in order to add a 
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third defendant, NRT, Inc., a New Jersey corporation doing business in Utah as Coldweli 
Banker Residential Brokerage (hereinafter Coldweli). R. 119-120. The trial court granted 
permission to amend on February 7, 2005 (R.165), and on March 28, Posner filed a First 
Amended Complaint in which he added Coldweli as a third defendant and dropped the 
breach of contract claims against defendants. R. 323-336. 
On March 28 and 29 respectively, Equity and Independence filed Motions and 
Memoranda in support of summary judgment. R.258-322 (Equity), R. 337-418 
(Independence). Posner filed a Memorandum Opposing Summary Judgment on April 14. 
R. 455-545. Defendants filed Reply Memoranda in Support of Summary Judgment on 
April 15 (Independence R. 546-566) and April 22 (Equity 594-601). On May 24, 2005 
the Court granted summary judgment to Equity and Independence. Addendum 1. Posner 
filed a timely notice of appeal of the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to 
Equity on June 20. R. 628-630. Posner did not appeal the Court's dismissal of his claim 
against Independence. Mr. Posner and Coldweli Banker jointly requested, and were 
granted, a stay of proceedings pending the outcome of this appeal. R. 635-637. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the summer of 2002, Michael Posner retained Coldweli Banker Residential 
Brokerage to list two lots he owned in Deer Valley, and hired Coldweli real estate agent 
Kandis Christoffersen. R. 274,^'s 12, 13 (First Amended Complaint). In July, Posner 
negotiated a sale of his land for a purchase price of $450,000 (R.287, Posner's Real 
Estate Purchase Contract), agreeing to provide $260,000 in seller financing. Addendum 
3. To ensure that he would receive payment in full, Posner inserted a condition in his 
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Real Estate Purchase Contract (REPC) that required the buyer, Chris Strachan, to supply 
a surety bond in the same amount as his seller financing. Addendum 4, Addendum 5. 
Posner retained Equity Title Insurance Agency, Inc. as his title company. R. 16 (Posner's 
Settlement Statement). The buyer hired Independence Title Insurance Agency of Salt 
Lake City as his title company. R.79. (Answer of Independence). 
On or about August 23, Posner signed closing papers, left them with Equity to 
complete the closing, and returned to his residence in Florida. R. 362, p. 34, Ins. 1-4 
(Posner Deposition). He did not give any written authorization to Kandis Christoffersen 
or anyone at Equity to make changes on his behalf. R. 481-483, ^ j's 3,11,12. (Posner 
Affidavit) On or about August 28, Strachan closed with Independence. R. 21 (Buyer's 
Settlement Statement). At closing Strachan supplied a document entitled "Financial 
Guarantee" (the Guarantee) for $260,000 (Addendum 2), and requested that Posner add 
$3,900 to the seller financing amount. Posner approved the $3,900 increase to his seller 
financing from his residence in Florida by fax and in writing (Addendum 3),1 but was 
never informed that the buyer had supplied a so-called "Financial Guarantee" for 
$260,000 rather than a surety bond for the full amount of the seller financing ($263,900). 
R. 483, t 14 (Posner's Affidavit). 
Equity closed Posner's sale when Kandis Christoffersen verbally instructed 
Equity escrow agent Helen Smith that Posner had seen and approved the Guarantee and 
said to close. R. 263-264, f s l-4(Equity's Statement of Undisputed Facts). Equity does 
not allege that it closed the sale with the signature of Posner or Kandis Christoffersen 
1
 See also R. 16, line 206 (Posner's Settlement Statement) 
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approving the change from a $263,900 surety bond to a $260,000 Financial Guarantee. R. 
263-264, f s 1-4 (Equity's Statement of Undisputed Facts). See also Addendum 3. 2 
Subsequently, Strachan never made a payment on the land. When Posner learned 
of Strachan's default in November of 2002, he attempted to collect on the Financial 
Guarantee but it proved worthless. R. 329, <|[ 31 (First Amended Complaint). To mitigate 
his damages, Posner bought back his land in June of 2003 for approximately $120,000 
more than he had received at the time of closing. R 334, f 37(First Amended Complaint). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Posner alleges negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against Equity for closing 
his land sale with a "Financial Guarantee" rather than the "surety bond" his REPC 
required. In granting summary judgment to Equity, the trial court ruled that (1) real 
estate agent Kandis Christoffersen's instructions to Equity to close fell within the scope 
of "her actual implied and/or apparent authority" as Posner's real estate agent and (2) that 
Equity breached no duty to Posner. Addendum 1. 
The trial court erred in finding that Christoffersen's verbal instructions provided a 
basis for Equity to close, as changes to Posner's REPC required his written approval.3 In 
this case, Christoffersen's instruction to close with the $260,000 Financial Guarantee 
changed the contract in two respects: (1) it allowed closing to occur without a valid 
2
 Addendum 3 is the page of Posner's REPC on which he crossed out the figure of $260,000, wrote in 
$263,900 and initialed approval of this new amount of seller financing early on the morning of August 30, 
2002. This page contains the requirement "surety bond will be issued in the amount above before close"; 
but no further modifications by Posner appear on this page. 
3
 Three days prior to the hearing on summary judgment, counsel for Posner informed the trial court via 
letter and defendants via email and letter, that she intended to rely on the Statute of Frauds and Posner's 
REPC. This letter does not appear in the official record; however, the transcript from the summary 
judgment hearing confirms that Judge Medley and Equity received notice: (R. 644, p. 16-20; p. 32-34). At 
the conclusion of oral argument, the trial court gave the defendants a week to brief this point of law. R. 
644, p. 28 and pp. 35-36. Defendants declined to brief this point. R. 644, p. 36. 
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"surety bond"; and (2) it altered the amount of seller financing from $263,900 to 
$260,000. See Addenda 2-5. 
U.C.A. §25-5-3, case law and the terms of Posner's REPC require changes to a 
real estate contract to be made in writing by either a party to the contract, or his 
authorized agent. Golden Key Realty v. Mantas, 699 P. 2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985), Zion 's 
Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P. 2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975); Coombs v. Ouzounian, 465 P. 
2d 356, 358 (Utah 1970). When she instructed Equity to close, Christoffersen possessed 
neither Posner's written approval of the Guarantee nor written authorization to act in his 
place. Equity's summary judgment motion provided no evidence that anyone—Posner or 
Christoffersen—approved the Financial Guarantee in writing. R.258-322, R. 594-601 
(Equity's Memorandum and Reply in Support of Summary Judgment). Accordingly, the 
trial court's ruling that Christoffersen acted within her authority is incorrect as a matter of 
law. 
In addition, the trial court plainly erred in ruling that Equity's evidence met the 
threshold requirements for actual, implied or apparent authority. For example, the scope 
of a real estate agent's authority must be set forth in writing.4 Equity's evidence that 
Christoffersen had actual/implied authority, however, consists solely of deposition 
testimony. As Equity has not offered the agency contract between Posner and 
Christoffersen into evidence (R. 263-264, Undisputed Facts, Equity's Summary 
Judgment Memorandum), and Posner denies that his agency contract contained such 
authority (R.481, % 12 (Posner Affidavit), there is no proper basis for finding that 
Christoffersen acted within her actual authority. 
4
 Utah Admin. Code Rl 62-6-1(6.1.11.1.). 
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Equity's argument in support of apparent authority is also deficient; its evidence 
fails to establish that Posner's conduct caused Equity's escrow agent to believe that 
Christoffersen could change Posner's contract without written authorization. In fact, 
Smith admitted that she knew she needed Posner's, not Christoffersen's, approval to 
close with the Financial Guarantee. R. 525, Ins. 20-25, R. 526, R. 527, Ins. 1-4. (Smith 
Deposition). See City Elec. V. Dean Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P. 2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983): 
".. .apparent authority vanishes when the third party has actual knowledge of the real 
scope of the agent's authority." 
For these reasons, the trial court's ruling that Christoffersen acted within her 
authority should be reversed. If the trial court's ruling on Christoffersen's authority is 
reversed, then the second ruling that Equity breached no duty must also be reversed, as 
Equity has offered no other undisputed facts or points of law to substantiate this ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court's ruling violates the Utah Statute of Frauds and Posner's 
REPC. 
The trial court's conclusion that Kandis Christoffersen acted within her authority 
disregards the fundamental requirement that changes to a real estate contract must be in 
writing. Utah's Statute of Frauds U.C.A. § 25-5-3 states in pertinent part: 
Every contract .. .for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void 
unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the 
party by whom the sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in 
writing. 
When the law requires a contract to be in writing, any changes to the contract 
must also be made in writing. See Golden Key Realty v. Mantas, 699 P. 2d 730, 732 
(Utah 1985), Zion'sProperties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P. 2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975); Coombs 
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v. Ouzounian, 465 P. 2d 356, 358 (Utah 1970). See also § 301 STATUTE OF FRAUDS 72 
Am. Jur. 2d: Generally, a contract for the exchange of lands entered into by an agent 
under verbal authority cannot be enforced where the Statute of Frauds requires the 
authority of the agent.. .to be in writing. Consistent with U.C.A. § 25-5-3, Posner's 
REPC also required that all changes "must be made in writing by the Parties to the 
contract". Addendum 6 
The Statute of Frauds applies to Posner's land sale; therefore, his real estate 
contract, and any changes to it, had to be in writing. Indeed, since applicable law as well 
as the REPC required Posner's written authorization to change the contract terms, his real 
estate agent, under any theory of authority, certainly could not make changes verbally. 
To decide differently not only defeats the purpose of the Statute Frauds but also gives an 
agent more legal power than her principal possessed at the outset. 
At closing, Posner's REPC was materially changed without his written 
authorization: Posner authorized $263,900 in seller financing, and his REPC specifically 
required "a surety bond in the same amount" as the seller financing. Equity accepted a 
Financial Guarantee that departed from this REPC requirement in two ways: it was 
designated "Financial Guarantee", rather than "surety bond" 5 and it was written for 
$3,900 less than the REPC required.6 When Equity closed with the Guarantee, it 
5
 Significantly, the trial court considered whether "Financial Guarantee" and "Surety bond" were 
synonymous terms in Independence's Motion to Dismiss (R 27-32) and its Reply Memorandum. R. 48-55 
The Court declined to make a final determination on this point and denied Independence's motion. R. 75. 
6
 Under Utah law, a "surety bond" must be issued by a licensed insurance company authorized by the state 
insurance department, see U.C.A. § 31A -22-103, and must comply with minimum capital or surplus 
requirements set by the state: U.C.A. § 31 A-5-211. Posner claims the Financial Guarantee was not a surety 
bond. R. 39-43. (Posner's Memorandum in Response to 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss). 
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accepted a document that materially departed from the terms of Posner's REPC without 
his written approval.7 
Posner's written authorization (or written approval from an agent authorized by 
Posner in writing) was a necessary prerequisite to closing with the Guarantee rather than 
a $263,900 surety bond. Significantly, even if Posner had approved the Guarantee, his 
signature was still necessary. Equity has never supplied written authorization approving 
the Guarantee as grounds for Kandis Christoffersen's authority (R. 263, R. 598), yet this 
is the only proper basis for finding that Christoffersen had authority to change the 
contract. The trial court's ruling that Christoffersen acted within her authority is therefore 
incorrect. This point alone provides the reviewing the Court with sufficient grounds for 
reversing the trial court's decision on Christoffersen's authority: "Summary judgment is 
appropriate only when.. .the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hill 
v. Allred, 28 P.3d 1271, 1275 (Utah 2001); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
B. The Trial Court erred in ruling that Kandis Christoffersen acted within the 
scope of her actual implied and/or apparent authority. 
Even if the Utah Statute of Frauds is not controlling on the issue of 
Christoffersen's authority, reversal is still warranted because 1) Equity's evidence of 
Christoffersen's actual or implied authority is legally insufficient, and 2) Equity's 
evidence does not satisfy threshold requirements for finding apparent authority. 
7
 Given Equity's failure to present either evidence or argument refuting Posner's claim that his REPC was 
breached, and consistent with the requirement to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, Posner's claim that a breach occurred must be taken as true for the purposes of this 
appeal. See Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol, 70 P.3d 72, 75 (Utah 2003): in reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment, [the reviewing court must] view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
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a. Actual Authority 
Actual authority encompasses both express and implied authority. Zion 's First 
National Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P. 2d 1090, 1994, (Utah 1988). In support of 
its claim that Christoffersen had express authority, Equity relies (R. 266) on the general 
rule that "Express authority exists where the principal directly states that an agent has the 
authority to perform a particular act on the principal's behalf." (emphasis added) Id., 
(additional cites omitted). The sole basis of Equity's claim that Christoffersen had 
express authority is deposition testimony by Posner: 
The only reason that Kandis was at my closing was to get her commission. And 
my contact with her as being I guess my agent was to make sure that it closed. And she 
was the one negotiating back and forth with the contract [the REPC] as far as making 
sure that we had surety bond and how much it was and everything else. R. 267 
In this quote Posner describes what he thought Christoffersen was doing at his 
closing. This statement does not trump other deposition testimony Posner has cited as 
proof that he did not authorize Christoffersen.9 R. 467. (Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition to Equity's Summary Judgment Motion) Indeed, Posner's explicit denial that 
he granted Christoffersen express authority in and of itself raises a factual issue 
mandating rejection of summary judgment. See R. 483, Tf's 11, 12. (Posner's Affidavit) 
Moreover, as a matter of law, Equity's reliance on such verbal evidence is 
inapposite: in Utah, a real estate agent's express authority must be put in writing. Utah 
Admin. Code, Rule 162-6-1(6.1.11.1) (1993)l0 requires that the scope of a real estate 
Nor is it clear that the second sentence of this quotation refers to Christoffersen's role at closing, rather 
than to her role as a conduit for negotiations between Posner and Strachan regarding the original 
requirement of the surety bond. 
9
 Both quotes are retrospective commentaries uttered more than two years after Posner's closing; as such, 
neither constitutes direct evidence of a statement Posner made, prior to his closing, expressly authorizing 
Christoffersen to act for him at his closing. 
10
 Pursuant to U.C.A. § 61-2-5.5, creating a Real Estate Commission authorized to make administrative 
rules, Utah Admin. Code Rule 162-6-1(6.1.11.1) (1993) of the Division of Real Estate, Utah Department of 
10 
agent's authority be defined in a written agency agreement. The written agency 
agreement between Posner and Coldwell Banker was Posner's listing agreement. R. 301, 
Ins. 4-9. (Christoffersen Deposition); R. 468. (Posner's Memorandum Opposing 
Summary Judgment). 
A listing agreement does not grant broad or general powers to a real estate agent, 
but commonly confers to a brokerage the right to find a buyer for the vendor and to 
receive a commission, §13.02(b)(1), § 13.02(b)(1)(f). Realtor Agreements; Commissions. 
UTAH REAL PROPERTY LAW, 1999. See also Pilling v. Eastern and Pacific Enterprises 
Trust, 702 P. d 1232, 1237 (Wash. App. 1985): (The scope of the agency between the 
seller and the broker is defined by the agent's purpose, which is to find a purchaser.); 
Painter v. Huke, 862 P. 2d 566, 568 (Ore. App. 1993): (listing agreement authorizing 
broker to sell vendor's property "at the selling price and on the terms noted" did not 
provide express or implied authority to agent to accept a buyer's offer on terms different 
than those specified in the contract). 
In particular, a listing agreement does not authorize real estate agents to transact 
transfers of real property on behalf of their principals. See Frandsden v. Gerstner, 487 P. 
2d 697,700 (Utah 1971): (A listing agreement empowering the realtor to find a buyer 
does not authorize the broker in writing to execute a contract of sale on behalf of his 
principal: "Thus the authority of a real estate broker with whom lands are listed for sale 
does not extend to the signing of a contract for sale. The power to execute a contract of 
Commerce requires a principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf who represent a seller to "have a 
written agency agreement with the seller defining the scope of the agency." 
11
 Cf. Baumgartner v. Burt, 365 P. 2d 681, 682(Colo. 1961): The relationship between an agent and his 
principal is a contractual one and the extent of the rights and duties of each is to be found in the express or 
implied terms of the agency contract. 
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sale is an additional authority that must be expressly granted in writing." citing Queen 
City Lumber Co. v. Fisher, 111 N.W. 2d 714, 716 (N.D. 1961). 
Posner claims that he expressly authorized Christoffersen to help find a buyer for his 
land and nothing more. R.481, j^'s 3, 11, 12 (Posner Affidavit). Equity has not refuted 
Posner's position with proof that Christoffersen's written contract of agency included the 
power to negotiate his sales terms and sign in place of him, nor explained how an 
expressly delegated power to find a buyer for Posner transformed into the far broader 
authority to act in Posner's place and approve a Financial Guarantee in place of a "surety 
bond." R. 261-322 and R. 594-601. (Equity's Memorandum and Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Summary Judgment). 
By law, Christoffersen's express authority must be written, yet Equity's evidence 
of her express authority is deposition testimony. The trial court's finding that express 
authority existed is incorrect, as it is not based on a written document establishing such 
authority. At present the record contains nothing more than conflicting testimony on this 
matter and summary judgment is not appropriate. Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol, 70 
P.3d 72,75 (Utah 2003) (Summary judgment only appropriate where there are no 
disputed issues of material fact). 
Equity also urges that Christoffersen had actual authority under the doctrine of 
implied authority. When an agent is given express authority, he acquires, by implication, 
the implied authority to do all that is necessary to exercise the authority expressly 
granted. Thus an agent has implied authority if his conduct fell within the scope of, or 
was incidental, necessary, usual or proper to, the main authority delegated. Diston v. 
12 
Enviropak Med. Products, Inc., 893 P. 2d 1071, 1076 (Utah App. 1995). An analysis of 
actual authority, whether express or implied, focuses on the acts of the principal from the 
agent's perspective. Id. 
In support of its claim that Christoffersen had implied authority, Equity states that 
Ms. Christoffersen was Posner's "listing agent." R. 266, R. 288. As set forth above, 
however, the only express authority a listing agreement gives is authority to help the 
seller find a buyer. Moreover, the record demonstrates that Christoffersen herself did not 
believe she had such implied authority at closing, as she took steps to obtain Posner's 
written authorization of the new amount of seller financing. R. 3045, Ins. 2-18. 
In giving verbal instructions to close with a document that materially breached 
the terms of Posner's REPC without Posner's written authorization, Christoffersen acted 
without authority. Approving a change in the type of financial security required for 
seller financing was no more "incidental, necessary or proper" to the authority Posner 
delegated to assist in finding a buyer than was approving a change in the amount of seller 
financing, for these unauthorized verbal instructions effectively altered the terms of 
Posner's agreement and ultimately thwarted the very purpose for which Christoffersen 
was hired. Christoffersen's conduct violated basic requirements under the Statute of 
Frauds and Posner's REPC that changes to his contract be made in writing, as well as 
fiduciary duties that she owed to Posner12. Therefore, Equity's argument that 
Christoffersen had implied authority is unfounded in law. 
12
 Pursuant to U.C.A. § 61-2-5.5 and 61-2-11, Christoffersen's conduct must conform to professional 
standards articulated in the Administrative Rules of the Division of Real Estate, Utah Department of 
Commerce. These standards include the prescription that that principal broker and licensees acting on his 
behalf owe to their principal fiduciary duties of care including full disclosure Utah Admin. Code R162-6-
2(1998) (6.2.15.1.(c)) and reasonable care and diligence 6.2.15. l.(e). 
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b. Apparent Authority 
"Apparent authority exists: 'where a person has created such an appearance of 
things that it causes a third party reasonably and prudently to believe that a second party 
has the power to act on behalf of the first person . . . . ' " (emphasis added) Walker Bank & 
Trust Company v. Jones, 672 P. 2d 73,75 (Utah 1983). An analysis of apparent authority 
must focus on the acts of the principal from a third party's perspective. Diston v. 
Enviropak Med. Products, Inc., 893 P. 2d 1071,1076 (Utah App. 1995). As applied to this 
case, Christoffersen had apparent authority if the evidence shows that Posner's conduct 
led Equity reasonably and prudently to believe that Christoffersen could give verbal 
instructions that substantially changed her principal's REPC without his written 
authorization. Equity's evidence of Posner's conduct fails to meet this threshold 
requirement. 
Equity urges that Christoffersen had apparent authority because "listing 
Christoffersen as his agent on the REPC, using her to negotiate the contract, delegating to 
her the responsibility of 'making sure that we had a surety bond and how much it was and 
everything else'" created the appearance of apparent authority. R. 267-268 (Equity's 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment). Merely hiring a real estate agent to sell 
land and noting this on the REPC is not sufficient conduct on Posner's part to create the 
appearance that Christoffersen had authority to change Posner's REPC without his 
written approval. Under general principles of agency law, a real estate agent is deemed to 
be a special agent acting under a limited power, rather than a general agent, and has the 
power to do only those acts specifically named in the contract of agency, (emphasis 
added) 3 Am. Jur. 2d §122 AGENCY; 12 Am Jur. 2d §88 BROKERS (See also Martin v. 
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Vincent^ 593 P. 2d 45, (Mont. 1979) (A real estate broker does not have general authority 
and is only authorized to do what is specifically assigned in his contract). 
The record plainly establishes that Smith understood that Christoffersen's agency 
was limited rather than general. None of Smith's actions indicate that she believed that 
Christoffersen possessed authority beyond helping Posner find a buyer and sell his land. 
On the contrary, Smith stated in her deposition that she did not believe Christoffersen had 
the authority to replace Posner and stated that she believed she needed Posner's approval 
to proceed to close. R. 525-527. (Smith Deposition). Smith testified that Posner told her 
his attorney had approved the Guarantee, again showing lack of reliance on any authority 
possessed by Christoffersen.13 R. 531, Ins. 14-25 (Smith Deposition). Christoffersen had 
openly told Posner, in Helen Smith's presence, that she had no idea what a surety bond 
was. R. 544, Ins. 13-18. (Christoffersen Deposition). Smith's decision to accept 
Christoffersen's verbal representations regarding Posner's wishes, when the documents 
before her plainly deviated from the express terms of Posner's REPC, signals her own 
misjudgment, not evidence of her belief in Christoffersen's apparent authority. 
Furthermore, apparent authority cannot be invoked by one who knows or has 
good reason to know the limits and extent of an agent's authority. 3 Am. Jur. 2d § 78. 
See Ellis v. Nelson, 233 P.2d 1072,1075 (Nev.1951): 
.. .there can be reliance only upon what the principal himself has said or done, or 
at least said or done through some other and authorized agent. The acts of the agent in 
question can not be relied upon as alone enough to support an estoppel. If his acts are 
relied upon there must also be evidence of the principal's knowledge and acquiescence in 
them. Moreover, in any case, the reliance must have been a reasonable one, consistent 
with the exercise of reasonable prudence, and the party who claims reliance must not 
have closed his eyes to warning or inconsistent circumstances, (emphasis added). 
13
 Posner's attorney supplied an affidavit stating he never saw the Financial Guarantee prior to closing. 
R. 587, | 11 . (Affidavit of Scott Poston). 
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Utah cases uphold this limitation: See Bodell Construction Company v. Stewart 
Title Guaranty Company, 945 P. 2d 119, 124 (Utah App. 1997); City Elec. V. Dean 
Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P. 2d 89,90 (Utah 1983); Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P. 2d 74, 
78 (Utah 1982), citing Dohrmann Hotel Supply Co. v. Beau Brummel, Inc., 103 P. 2d 650, 
651 (Utah 1940): one who deals with an agent has the responsibility to ascertain the 
agent's authority despite the agent's representations. Reliance on apparent authority is 
also not justified where it is inconsistent with the circumstances of the transaction. 3 Am. 
Jur. 2d § 78 AGENCY Simpson v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 248 N.E. 2d. 117, 
120 (111. 1969). The mere fact that Smith chose to rely on Christoffersen is not itself 
evidence of Christoffersen's authority.14 
On the facts of this case, Helen Smith knew or had good reason to know Kandis 
Christoffersen did not have the authority to change Posner's REPC without written 
approval. Helen Smith was not an uninformed third party in this transaction but an 
escrow agent. R. 519, Ins. 5-21 (Smith Deposition) with a fiduciary duty15 to Posner. The 
record plainly establishes that Ms. Smith understood that Posner's REPC functioned as 
her escrow instructions (R. 519, Ins. 7-12, Smith Deposition) and that she knew Posner's 
closing documents needed to meet the terms of his REPC. R. 520, lines 15-20. (Smith 
Deposition). As an escrow agent bound to follow the terms of the REPC, Smith knew or 
should have known that Posner's signature was required to approve a change in his 
REPC. Addendum 6. Thus it was neither prudent nor reasonable for Smith to rely on 
verbal instructions from Christoffersen. Equity's assertion of apparent authority is an 
attempt to escape liability for its agent's failure to act to protect Posner's interests simply 
14
 "Authority is not 'apparent' simply because the party claiming has acted upon his conclusions." Tsouras 
v. Southwest Plumbing and Heating, 587 P. 2d 1321, 1323 (Nev. 1978). 
15
 Freegard v. First Western National Bank, 738 P. 2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987) 
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by contacting him directly. None of the evidence supplied in Equity's motion for 
summary judgment can correctly be construed as sufficient in law to support a finding of 
apparent authority. 
C. The Trial Court's conclusion that Equity breached no duty to Posner should be 
reversed 
In Utah, escrow agents owe a fiduciary duty of care to the parties to an escrow. In 
Freegardv. First Western National Bank, 738 P. 2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court noted "it is well established that an escrow agent assumes the role of the 
agent of both parties to the transaction, and as such, a fiduciary is held to a high standard 
of care in dealing with its principals." See also New West Federal Savings and Loan 
Assoc, v. Guardian Title Company of Utah, 818 P. 2d 585, 589 (1991 Utah App.); Hertz 
v. Nordic Limited, Inc., 761 P. 2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1988).16 
Although an escrow agent's fiduciary duty may vary somewhat according to 
jurisdiction, courts agree that the core of the escrow agent's fiduciary duty is to follow 
the escrow instructions. See, e.g., Schoepe v. Zion 's First National Bank, 750 F. Supp. 
1084, 1088, (D. Utah 1990), (noting Utah courts have endorsed the principle that "the 
scope of the escrow agent's duty is governed by the escrow agreement, and includes, at 
minimum, an obligation to exercise reasonable skill and ordinary diligence in following 
the escrow instructions." (Additional cites omitted) 
In the instant case, Posner's escrow agent, Helen Smith, closed his sale with a 
document that, in both name and amount, did not match the specific requirements of the 
This principle is recognized in other jurisdictions as well: The escrow agent must strictly 
comply with the instructions of the principals. See, e.g., Manley v. Ticor, 798 P. 2d 1327, 1331 (Az. Ct. 
App 1989): "[H]e must conduct the affairs with which he is entrusted with scrupulous honesty, skill, and 
diligence." National Bank of Washington v. Equity Investors, 506 P. 2d 20, 35 (Wash. 1973). 
17 
REPC terms. Despite the notable discrepancies between the REPC terms and the 
Guarantee, and despite the fact that Smith was an agent who owed a fiduciary duty of 
care to Posner, Equity's phone records show no fax to Posner's residence in Florida prior 
to his closing. R. 461; R. 504-515. As alleged in the Equity's summary judgment motion, 
the sole foundation upon which Ms. Smith based her decision to close was that Posner's 
real estate agent told her that Posner had approved the Guarantee and said that closing 
could occur. Ms. Smith closed without requesting or receiving written authorization of 
the Guarantee from Mr. Posner. 
Ms. Christoffersen's verbal instructions in closing Posner's sale were not a legally 
sufficient basis for Ms. Smith to close Posner's sale. As set forth previously, to verify 
that she had Mr. Posner's actual knowledge and approval of the Guarantee, as well as 
comply with her professional obligations to disclose relevant information in a diligent 
manner, Ms. Christoffersen was required to obtain Posner's signature approving the 
Guarantee. Measured by either the law governing real estate transactions or the 
professional standards of the real estate business, nothing short of a signature was a 
sufficient basis for Ms. Christoffersen, in Utah, to conclude that Posner, in Florida, had 
seen and approved the Guarantee. 
As set forth previously, the evidence plainly establishes that Smith knew she was 
obliged to follow the terms of Posner's REPC, and therefore should have known that 
Posner's signature was required to approve a change in his REPC. Addendum 6. To 
verify that Christoffersen's instructions were proper and accurate, Smith should have 
either insisted that Christoffersen supply Posner's written approval of the Financial 
18 
Guarantee, or else obtained it herself. There is thus no proper basis for concluding that 
Smith was entitled to rely on Christoffersen's verbal instructions. 
Appellee's motion for summary judgment depends, in its entirety, on the 
assertion that it was justified in relying on Christoffersen's authority, whether 
actual/implied or apparent. R. 263, 268. If Equity's argument regarding Christoffersen's 
authority is incorrect, then there is no basis in fact or law to refute Posner's claims of 
fiduciary breach. Therefore, if the trial court's ruling on Christoffersen's authority is 
reversed, its finding of no fiduciary breach must also be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons put forth above, Appellant respectfully requests this Court to 
confirm that Posner's written approval of the Guarantee was required by law and to 
reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment on this basis, remanding for further 
proceedings consistent with this ruling. In addition or in the alternative, Appellant 
requests the Court to find Equity's evidence of Christoffersen's authority insufficient as a 
matter of law, reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment on this basis and 
remanding for proceedings consistent with this ruling. 
Dated this day of November, 2005. 
Catherine James 
Michael Goldsmith 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Michael C. Posner 
G& 
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ADDENDUM 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL C. POSNER, an : MINUTE ENTRY 
individual, 
: CASE NO. 040901853 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EQUITY TITLE INSURANCE AGENCY/ 
INC., a Utah Corporation; : 
INDEPENDENCE TITLE INSURANCE 
AGENCY/ a Utah Corporation; and : 
NRT Inc./ a New Jersey 
Corporation doing business in : 
Utah as COLDWELL BANKER 
RESIDENTIAL BROKERAGE/ : 
Defendants. : 
Defendant Equity Title Insurance Agency and defendant 
Independence Title's Motions for Summary Judgment were taken under 
advisement by the Court after the submission of Memoranda and oral 
argument by counsel. After further consideration and review of all 
Memoranda in support, opposition and reply, the Court rules as 
follows. 
1. Both defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are granted 
in full as prayed for. Based upon all of the undisputed material 
facts, legal authorities and legal analyses set forth in both 
defendants' Memoranda in support and reply incorporated herein by 
this reference, the Court finds that plaintiffs' agent, 
POSNER V. EQUITY 
TITLE INSURANCE PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
Christoffersen, was acting within the scope of her actual implied 
and/or apparent authority when she communicated plaintiff's 
approval of the Financial Guarantee. Consequently, neither 
defendant breached any duty owed to plaintiff by following 
directions given by plaintiff's agent. Additionally, defendant 
Independence owed plaintiff no duty, its duty is owed to the buyer 
as the buyer's escrow agent. 
2. Plaintiff's pending Motion to Compel is now moot. 
3. Counsel for defendants are instructed to submit a joint 
Order consistent with this Minute Entry and Rule 7(f), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this >-" day of May, 2CK)5 
T^YROKffe E. MEDK 
DIS^R/ICT COURT 
POSNER V. EQUITY 
TITLE INSURANCE PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this, day of May, 
2005: 
Catherine James 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
5945 Sierra Drive 
Mountain Green, Utah 84050 
Michael Goldsmith 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2697 Cottage Loop 
Park City, Utah 84098 
David M. Bennion 
Attorney for Defendant Equity Title 
201 S. Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
George W. Burbidge II 
Attorney for Defendant Independence Title 
50 S. Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
David W. Overholt 
Robert A. Ponte 
Attorneys for Defendant NRT 
901 W. Baxter Drive 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
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ADDENDUM 2 
FINANCIAL GUARANTEE 
THIS GUARANTEE is made and entered Into, by and between AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES 
CORPORATION, hereinafter called GUARANTOR; and STRACHAN & ASSOCITES, LLC, hereinafter 
called BORROWER, for the benefit of MICHAEL C. POSNER, hereinafter called LENDER. 
WITNESSETH 
WHEREAS, LENDER expects to loan to BORROWER certain assets, namely $260, 000 (two hundred 
and sixty thousand dollars), balance of purchase price of a certain property located at 350 Deer Valley 
Drive, Park City, Utah., \t) terms of an agreement entered into between Borrower and Lender, dated 
August 2*, 2002, hereinafter referred to as the loan, and 
WHEREAS, BORROWER desires GUARANTOR to act as GUARANTOR, at BORROWER'S request, to 
LENDER, for the amount on the Loan described below; and 
WHEREAS, GUARANTOR is willing to act as GUARANTOR subject to the provisions hereof; 
NOW THEREFORE, FOR VALUE RECEIVED, including the promises and mutual covenants herein set 
forth, BORROWER, LENDER and GUARANTOR do hereby mutually agree as follows: 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
1. DEFINITIONS 
For the purposes of Ihis Guarantee, the terms and phrases listed below shall have only the 
meaning shown when used herein; 
(a) TheHGUARANTORH means the GUARANTOR whose name appears on the face of 
the Guarantee. 
(b) The "LENDER" means the LENDER to whom the GUARANTOR is obligated and 
whose name appears in this Guarantee, and who makes a loan of securities to the 
BORROWER and whose interest in the Loan Instrument is an equitable interest under a 
contract or promissory note. 
(c) The "BORROWER" means the one stated as BORROWER on the Loan instrument, 
whether single or multiple individuals, partnership, corporation or other legal entity. 
(d) The "Loan Instrument" means any written evidence of obligation, including a 
promissory note, loan agreement, Asset Holder Agreement, or other debt instrument, 
obtained from the BORROWER by the LENDER which bears a genuine signature of the 
BORROWER and all other parties to the instrument, is complete on its face, and Is valid 
and enforceable against the BORROWER. 
(e) A "Loss" means the aggregate amount of an unpaid principal and lease fees not to 
exceed $260,000 (two hundred and sixty thousand doilars)on the loan instrument plus 
interest payments, evidencing an Eligible Loan which is in default notwithstanding 
anything to the contrary herein, loss shall exclude penalties of any nature and expenses 
of collection, and shall be reduced by any payments made by the GUARANTOR. The 
aggregate of all losses under the Guarantee shall in no event exceed the Limit of 
Liability stated in the Guarantee. 
DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 
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(f) A "Loan" means an advance of funds or securities evidenced by a loan instrument, 
the proceeds of which have been or are to be used solely for the project as declared to 
the LENDER and the GUARANTOR as set forth above. 
(g) The "Eligible Loan" means the total amount due inclusive of finance charges, if any. 
The loan shall be evidenced by a written instrument which bears a genuine signature of 
the BORROWER as well as all other parties. The Loan shall comply with all Federal, 
State, Province, and local rules, statutes and ordinances. 
(h) An "Extension" means the permission granted to the LENDER to allow a payment to 
be deferred. These deferred payments must be paid before a loan is satisfied. 
(i) The "Limit of Liability" means: the principal amount of two hundred and twenty five 
thousand dollars ($260,000), plus interest payments, the aggregate amount as stated 
shall be the GUARANTOR'S maximum liability under this Guarantee. 
(j) The "Application" means any statement and/or presentation, either orally or in writing, 
made by the BORROWER, LENDER or their agents, servants or employees, in order to 
induce the GUARANTOR to issue this Guarantee. 
(k) The "Payment" means a deposit by the BORROWER with the LENDER of funds or 
the return of securities which represents the full or partial payment on the Loan 
Instrument evidencing an eligible loan, 
(I) The "Date of Default" means the earliest date upon which an installment payment was 
due which was not paid by ihe BORROWER according to the terms of the Loan 
Instrument. 
(m) The "Guarantee Period" means from August 28, 2002 to August 2&t 2003, and 
renewable annually thereafter for a period not to exceed ten years. In no event shall this 
Guarantee be called or loss claimed earlier than September 28, 2002. 
2. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO RECOVERY 
Each of the following Is a condition precedent to the obligation of the GUARANTOR to 
indemnify against a loss hereunder, and each condition must occur prior to any liability or 
obligation of the GUARANTOR to cover such loss. 
(a) Prior to making a Joan of the securities, the LENDER shall obtain financial 
information and representations from the BORROWER. The Lender will do such due 
diligence as it, in its sole discretion, deems necessary, which information will be made 
available to the Guarantor at the Guarantor's request. The Lender will consider such 
credit factors as a prudent person but one who does not routinely enter such 
transactions. 
(b) If, after the loan is made the LENDER discovers any material misstatements in the 
information given by the BORROWER, or misusage of the proceeds of the loan by the 
BORROWER, the LENDER shall promptly report such discovery to the GUARANTOR. 
(c) All payments received on account of the Loan Instrument, must be applied to the 
principal and interest payment due in their order, in the absence of specific written 
instructions from the GUARANTOR to do otherwise. 
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(d) The LENDER shall give written notice of default within thirty (30) days after the event 
and submit a claim, if the default is not rectified by the sixtieth (60th) day of default. 
3, EXCLUSIONS 
This Guarantee shall not indemnify the LENDER for any reasons other than for the default of the 
BORROWER, InclJding but not limited to any loss: 
(a) Resuming from the successful assertion of a defense against the LENDER releasing 
the BORROWER from the obligation to pay the Eligible Loan, or any judicial order, 
government statute, rule or regulation which otherwise extends, modifies or releases the 
BORROWER from obligation. 
(b) Resulting directly or indirectly from any dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of any 
officer or employee of the LENDER its successor, assigns or predecessors in interest, or 
any other person or business entity acting alone or in collusion with the BORROWER 
who is a party to the obligation covered by the GUARANTOR hereunder. 
(c) Resulting from forgery, 
(d) Resulting from any failure to comply with Federal, State, Province and local rules, 
statutes and regulations. 
4. CANCELLATION OF THE GUARANTEE 
Cancellation by the LENDER: This Guarantee may be canceled by the LENDER by returning it to 
the GUARANTOR or by mailing to the GUARANTOR a written notice of cancellation stating 
when, thereafter such cancellation shall be effective. Such cancellation shall not alter or affect 
the GUARANTORS obligation with respect to any Claims Notice which was received by it prior to 
the cancellation effective date. 
5. NOTICE OF DEFAULT 
The LENDER shall as soon as possible, and in no event later than thirty (30) days after the 
event, notify the GUARANTOR In writing that payments or interest under the Loan Instrument 
are in default. The LENDER shall also send a Notice of Default to the BORROWER and provide 
a copy of such notice to the GUARANTOR. Monthly reports indicating the status of the Loan is in 
default shall be given to the GUARANTOR thereafter until such Default is secured, an extension 
approved, or transfer of equity has been effected, 
6. SUBMISSION OF A CLAIM 
In the event that the Loan Instrument is in default for thirty (30) days and the BORROWER, after 
notice from the LENDER as required herein, has not made payment to rectify the default, by the 
sixtieth (60th) day of default, the LENDER shall, within ten (10) days thereafter, send a notice of 
claim to the GUARANTOR. Upon receipt of a Notice of Claim, the GUARANTOR shall take one 
of the following actions: 
(a) Pay Installments due thereon; 
(b) Pay the aggregate amount, less all prior payments by the BORROWER. 
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CONVEYANCE OF SECURITY OR COLLATERAL 
As an express condition to the settlement of any claim hereunder, the LENDER shall tender to 
the GUARANTOR an assignment of the lien, or collateral, within a reasonable period of time 
after settlement is made in accordance with the rights of subrogation herein (paragraph 10), 
AMOUNT OF LOSS 
(a) Within sixty (60) days of a submission of claim, and subject to the provisions of 
paragraphs 12 and 13, the GUARANTOR shall pay such claim by paying LENDER 
directly. 
(b) In any event, the GUARANTOR may elect either to make installment payments in 
accordance with the Loan Instrument which \s in default (in which case the 
GUARANTOR will, at the time of its first installment payment, make all payments in 
default) or unless other agreements are agreed to, or replacement instrument is provided 
for with the concurrence to the LENDER, or pay the LENDER the full amount of loss 
calculated in accordance with paragraph, 1 (e) 
(c) In any event, there shall be no acceleration of the subject Loan Instrument or the 
Eligible Loan, if either is subject to acceleration by the terms hereof. 
WHERE NOTICE IS GIVEN 
All notices, pleadings, claims, tenders and reports and other data required to be given by the 
LENDER to the GUARANTOR shall be sent by courier service or registered mail (return receipt 
requested) and directed lo the GUARANTOR in care of its Agent of Record as listed, 
SUBROGATION 
Upon payment of any claim under this Guarantee, the GUARANTOR shall be subrogated to the 
LENDER'S rights under the terms of the Loan Instrument and against the BORROWER and any 
other party, business entity or organizations liable under the terms of the Defaulted LENDER'S 
instrument and against any reserves or holdbacks in the LENDER'S possession. The LENDER 
shall execute and deliver at the request of the GUARANTOR all instruments and papers and do 
whatever else is necessary to transfer, assign and secure such rights, the execution by the 
LENDER of a release or waiver of the right to collect the unpaid amount due on any Loan 
Instrument shall equally release the GUARANTOR from any further obligation under this 
Guarantee astotheloan Instrument. In the event the Loan Instrument is paid in full, the 
GUARANTOR shall be subrogated to the rights of the LENDER under the security and/or 
collateral Hen on said security and/or collateral to the extent of claim payments made directly by 
the GUARANTOR to the LENDER pursuant to this Guarantee. 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
(a) Transfer of interest: Transfer of the BORROWER'S obligations under the Loan 
Instrument and of the BORROWER'S interest in any collateral securing such Loan 
Instrument shall not be'permitted by the LENDER. 
(b) Reports and Examinations of Records: The GUARANTOR may at any time call upon 
the LENDER for such reports as it may deem necessary and may inspect any accounts 
or records of the LENDER which are applicable lo the Loan Instrument. Such 
examination? shall be made during the normal business hours of the LENDER. 
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(c) Conformity of Statutes: The terms and conditions of the Guarantee, if any, that are in 
conflict with the statutes or laws of the jurisdiction where the Goar^niee is performed are 
hereby amended to conform with the minimum requirements of the State of Utah and 
Federal statutes of law, 
(d) All instruments evidencing or securing or otherwise relating to the Loan must be 
satisfactory to the GUARANTOR. 
(e) Failure by the BORROWER or the LENDER to satisfy any conditions as set forth 
above or elsewhere within this Guarantee, shall relieve the GUARANTOR of any 
obligations to perform under this instrument, but in such event, all premiums paid shall 
be regarded as earned and shall be retained by GUARANTOR. 
(f) GUARANTOR shall be liable to LENDER in accordance with this Guarantee, and 
LENDER shall not be required to first exhaust its remedies against BORROWER. 
(g) Applicability: The terms and conditions of this Guarantee are to the benefit of and be 
binding upon the GUARANTOR and the LENDER, their successors and assigns. 
(h) Assignment of This Agreement: In order to assign the Guarantee the LENDER shall 
complete a Certificate of Assignment and the GUARANTOR shall consent to assignment 
In writing by a duly authorized officer of the GUARANTOR. Consent of assignment shall 
not be unreasonably withheld be the GUARANTOR; however, the LENDER may not 
assign the Guarantee without the prior written consent of the GUARANTOR and this 
Guarantee shall be deemed null and void ff assigned or transferred without the written 
consent of the GUARANTOR, whether such transfer be voluntary or involuntary. 
(i) Waiver Provision: No Waiver of any condition or covenant of this Guarantee shall be 
effective unless in writing and signed by the party against whom said waiver \s asserted 
and no failure to exercise and any right or remedy by either the LENDER or the 
GUARANTOR shall be considered to imply or constitute a further waiver by such part by 
name or any other condition, covenant, right remedy, except as provided herein. 
(j) Amendments: Notice to any agent or knowledge possessed by any agency or by any 
other person shall not effect a waiver or change any part of this Guarantee or stop the 
GUARANTOR or the LENDER from asserting any right under the terms of the 
Guarantee. The terms of this Guarantee may be waived, amended, or changed only 
after written approval of the GUARANTOR by its President, or authorized representative, 
agent and/or assigns. 
(k) Conflict: It is understood and agreed that in the event of a conflict between provisions 
of this form and any expression of Intent to cover or any other paper, the provisions of 
this form shall apply. 
EXPENSES, COMMISSIONS, ETC 
BORROWER shall be solely and exclusively responsible for, and shall promptly pay, all fees, 
costs and expenses due any agent, broker, attorney, forwarders, finders, or any other party 
entitled to receive funds or which may be payable as a result of BORROWER entering into this 
Guarantee Agreement. 
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13. CONSIDERATION TO GUARANTOR 
BORROWER shall pay to GUARANTOR the sum of three thousand nine hundred dollars 
($3,900) upon the execution of this FINANCIAL GUARANTEE BOND and shall be fufly earned 
and shall be non refundable for any reason including cancellation. Further, as a condition to 
GUARANTORS continuing obligation hereunder, BORROWER shall pay to GUARANTOR an 
additional one and one half percent (1 V4 %) each year for a period not to exceed a total of ten 
(10) years of the unpaid principal balance, or only so long as this Guarantee is required by the 
LENDER on or before the fifteenth day prior to the anniyersary of the effective date of this 
Guarantee. This Guarantee is null and void ab initio m the event of non payment of any amount 
due, when due. 
14, BORROWER'S WARRANTY A3 TO AUTHORIZATION TO ACT 
If BORROWER is a corporation, trust or partnership, association or other legal entity, (he 
Individual or individuals signing the Guarantee Agreement on BORROWER'S behalf hereby 
expressly warrant: (a) that each such person has the full and complete aulhortty> pursuant to 
appropriate resolution, or other direction in writing of SORROWER'S Board of Directors, 
Trustees, General Manager or Managing Board of Directors who have been fully informed, 
concerning this transaction, understand and have approved the provisions of this Guarantee; and 
(b) that BORROWER is both in fact and in law, effectively bounded by the provisions of this 
Guarantee. 
All notices required to be given herein and all correspondence must be sent certified mail, return receipt 
requested or by Federal Express to: 
LENDER; Michael C. Posner, c/o The Manager, Caldwell Banker Residential Brokerage, 1750 Park 
Avenue, Park City, Utah, 84060 
BORROWER: Christopher Strachan: c/o Stephanie Gyllenskog, Allpro, 144 West 100 South, Brigham 
City, Utah, 84302 
GUARANTOR: Robert V. Murton, President, American Natural Resources Corporation, 10151 Thyme 
Circle, South Jordan, Utah. 84095. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, THE GUARANTOR has duly executed this Guarantee and endorsement 
attached and has caused these presents to be signed by its duly authorized officer on this 3rd day of 
August 2002. 
(Signed) 
President / 
/ < 
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_ ADDENDUM NO, 
REALTOR" TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
THIS IS AN 12d ADDENDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with 
an Offer Reference Date of 7-73-D? including all prior addenda and counteroffers, between 
Sr.irAcTi«Ti & ARqn r - f W f ^ T.T.n as Buyer, and Vnw»r _ _ as Seller 
regarding the Property located at 350 Deer V a l l e y Drive. _ _ , ._ The 
fallowing terms &re hereby incorporated as part of the REPC: ~~~ " ' "" " ' 
Buyer -co provide to teller a Surety Bond for the Sellers Financing; as 
per Keal Estare Purchase Contract and all Seller financing addendwng 
and all othftr flddpnflmn^ r* Min r-n-ni-rxnr on 350 ])i}t*r Valley T)T-?T7>» r 
to be provided before clos-ft^ nf the -pmp+rty. The closing shall "be on, ;>T before 
August 7/ 2002^ 5:00 PM Mottncain Time. All prorations shall stay the same 
August 2 2002- Buyer to pay 6ffSeller financing in full before starting 
any construction on property.
 t ^ 
To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC. including ail prior addenda 
and counteroffers, these terms shall control."Ali other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and Counteroffers, not 
modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [ ] Seller I>4.Bqyer shall have until [ ] AM [ ] PM 
Mountain Time to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with the 
provisions of Section/2S"bf the REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set fonh in this ADDENDUM shall lapse. 
[ ] Buyer [ \| Seller Signature Date Time [ ] Buyer[ ] Seller Signature Date Time 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTgROFFEJR/REJECTION 
CHECK ONE: 
£><1 ACCEPTANCE: [ ] Se l l e rX^Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM. 
[ ] COUNTEROFFER: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO, . 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) ((Signature) (D&te) -(Time) 
[ ] REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM. 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 17,1998. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM. 
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ADDENDUM NO. 8 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE: CONTRACT 
7H)£ IS AM [X] ADDENDUM [ ] CttUNTISROFFER to that RCAt ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT ftha T^HPO-) with an Offer 
flkfarerjce Date of JUfy 23. 2002 . fncIUc^ng all prior ftoWeflda and counteroffers, fcaWtaori Sirachgn & 
Associates LLC , & iJuyw, and Mfcfiaat Fosner 
Property laaaied at 350 Pear_Ve|<lev D y 
teneby incarpotetsd as pan afroe REPO; 
1. Buyer wlff (hcrEsree Surety Bond la carer new a^gjjqtrSelta^H carryi 
_ as Seller, rogarding the 
The;/oll6w!qg tarma are 
2. Rate fe Increased to 10%. 
3. Buyer will give Selfera check in tha ^mountof?1t1oaoo, toayverte^oft^tyng^agfbriandl 
belpfl purchased. 
r 
4, All other items on contract to remain tfKsflms. 
/ 
To the extent tlw tefftts of thfe ADDENDUM modify or conflict wllh any provisions of the RfePC, including all prior addenda and 
aaunfaroffers, Iheso terms ahq)[ control /'ill otter terms of the REPC, Including ill) p/far afc&nda and tfaunlBi'offers, nal modified by this 
ADDENDUM flhaH ramaJfl th&same. EX j SaNar [ 1 mty*r shall have until 5!0fl _ £ J AM [X) PM Mountain Tlmo on_ 
.(Dale), to p^ - r * ihe terms of tftte ADDENDUM irt scairdortca With tha provisions o| Section 23 of the REPC. 
Unless so accepted, the after aa set forth In thta ADDENDUM »hfli! l&pse. 
^ 
<d. % > 7 ^ < D 7 L 1 : ^ 0 A V [or"Signature (Date) <7ime) ' [ ] Puycr [ J Seller SlgnalUre 
AODEPtANCE/CX)UKT6RO FFElVF I EJECTION 
CHJ3CK ONE: 
IJJJ^ACCfiFTANCE: I 3 Salter [ ] Buyar horoby accepts tha termc pf thin ADDENDUM. 
(Date) flfme) 
t J CQU iJFFER: [ ] Sellar [ ] Eiuyar presenters a counteroffer the twins of attached ADpENDUM NO, 
(Sigria«|4rBj '" "$Ste) fTVh*) (SignalLire) 
£ 3 felEJElJfiON: [ ] Seller t JBuyHr -ejeote toe foregoing A D D ^ U M , 
(Dale) (Time) 
(Signature) (CiateJ (Time) (Signature) (D*te) (Time) 
THIS taHMAmiOVEttjaY THE UTAH RE^^ 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 17, 1HML IT fiEFFACES AND SUPfiflSEOES AIL pHE\10Usf_Y APPROVED VE&eJO^G CPTHI3 FORM, 
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for Title lroui anca as agreed to by Buyer under Section 8. Buyer also agrees to lake the Properly atofoct lo existing leasts 
affecting, the Property and net expiring prior lo Claang. 8uyer Agree* lo be responsible for taxes, assessments, homeowner* 
association dues, utilities, and other services provided to the Property a/ref Closing. Except for any loan(«) specifically 
assumed by Buyer under Section 2.1(c), Seller will oauae to be paid on by Closing ell mortgages, trust dcocs, judgments, 
mechanic's hem. tax liens and warrants. Seller will cause lo be paid eunent by Closing ail assessments and homeowner* 
association du*&. 
10.2 Condition of Properly, S^ler warrants that Ite Property wi II born thdtollowfnooond»lion ON THE DATE SELLER 
DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER: 
(n) the Property shall ba broom-dean and free 0/ ctebns and pergonal belongings. Any Setter or tenant moviivj-rBlaied 
damaje to the Property shad be repaired al Salter's expense; 
(b} tho heaBna cooiin$j4 electrical, friumWng and iprinKler system* and fixtures, and tha appliances and fireplace* VM'R bo 
in working oruer and nt for their Intended purposes. (e) the roof and foundation shall be free of leak* known to Sailer; (d; any private well Of septic tank serving Ihe Property shall have applicable permit, and shell DO in wwkino order and 
lit for it* intended purpose; and 
SI the Property and Improvero >nt$, including the landscaping, wW be in tfr* same general condition **(hoy wore on me W of Acceptance. 
11. WALK-THROUGH IN$PECT)OM Before Settlement, ftjyer m*y, Upon reft*x\abfe notice end at a reasonable time, 
conduct a ^*alkthrough• Inapecion of the Prcperty K> determine only that the Property is "a* represented," meaning that the 
Hems refarenotd in Sections 1.1,8.4 and 10 2 f 'the Items'') are n>*pctVety prt*&nt, mpoirtd/cnangftd ac agrood and in tho 
warrant** condition. If the lt*m$ a n not as represented, 6eH*r * t i prior lo-Settlement, replace, correct or repair the items 
or, with the oonserrt of Buyer (and Under K applicable), ascrow an amount at Srttament to provide for the samo Th$ failure 
to ocrxHKiaNveJk'thrtxjdi inspedioa OJ to d i m that an Hem Is not at reprwnted, ah*Jl not constitute a waiver by Buyer of 
the right lo rtoeJve, on me data of possession, the items as represented. 
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Srflar agree* that from the dafct of Acceptance until tfw date of Ck^lng, none of 
the Mowing shall ocour without the pnor written conaettt of Buyer: (a) no changes In arty exiting leax>s strati be ro*d«; (b) 
rw now J e a ^ shaft be entered Into; ^ 
und <d) no further financial encumbriwe* to the Property shaH be made, 
15. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyaror Seller is a corporation, partnti^ip, tws^ esUt*, I J m ^ 
entity, tho pmon executing tWa Contact on its behalf warranto his or har authority 10 do 50 and to bind Buyer and Seller. 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. Thia Contract together with Its addenda, any attached exhibit*, and Seller Disclosures, 
conaliJutes the entire Contract betvwrn the parties and supersede* aod mptocea any and u prior neootiaiioaj, copx&Qrtations, 
warrantee, understandings or centred* between the parties. Thla Contract cannot be chinked excopt by writ:en agreement 
Of the parties. 
15- DEPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties aflree that any dapue. nt&ria pKor to or after Cloairx). reined to tHt Contrect 
« X W A 1 L I J UAY (upon mutual agreement df (he parties) firrt be fiubmtt&KJ Jto modiatioa. If the p4rtie« aoroo lo mediation, 
fteobpUa stall be submitted to madation through a mediation provider mutuafly agreed-upon by the pcmios. Each party 
n&tv& \o bear ite own cotts of m^dlaBoa If mediation faBar tfie other procedure and remedies avaJabl* u»^or thia Central 
ahaff apply- Nothing In thla Section 15 shall prohibit any pany from aeeWng emergency equitable relief pending modialioa 
15. DEFAULT. If Suyw defaul?5, StUr may elect either 10 retain the Earnest Money Dsposfi ax liquidated damage, or to 
return It and *ue Buyer lo specifically enforce thk Contraci or pursue other remadfet available at tew. If Soflor default, hi 
adtfkjon K) return of the Earnest Money Deporii, Buyer may el^ct vitiw to aocept from Seller a sum e^ual !o the Earnest 
Money Deposit ^s llquldaled damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce tK$ Contract or pursue other remtdfes 
avaJJabfe at law. If Buyer elects ro accept liquidated damages, Seller agre^ to pay the ffoufdaiad damogos lo Buyer upon 
demand* It * egresd thai dental of a Loan Application made by the Buyer fe not a default and 13 ©ovamcrf by SocWon 2 3(b). 
17. ATTORNEY FEJES AWD COSTS., In the event of litiflAlfon or bindno arbtlTatfen lo enforce tM Contract, the jwvwllng 
^ ^ ^ S ^ 1 i t f f rSi00813 mi nmotab^ ^^^^y f e w Hcwev#r, attwroy fees shall not bo a w d o d for penkipalion in 
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